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Quantifying the importance and power of individual nodes depending on their position in socio-
economic networks constitutes a problem across a variety of applications. Examples include the
reach of individuals in (online) social networks, the importance of individual banks or loans in
financial networks, the relevance of individual companies in supply networks, and the role of traffic
hubs in transport networks. Which features characterize the importance of a node in a trade network
during the emergence of a globalized, connected market? Here we analyze a model that maps the
evolution of trade networks to a percolation problem. In particular, we focus on the influence of
topological features of the node within the trade network. Our results reveal that an advantageous
position with respect to different length scales determines the success of a node at different stages
of globalization and depending on the speed of globalization.
I. INTRODUCTION
Global connectivity is central to our social, economic
and technical development [1–4]. The growth of a global
transportation network has dramatically changed world
economy and led to increased efficiency and more cen-
tralized production [5]. But this global connectivity also
bears new, systemic risks - highlighted in particular in
the financial sector [6, 7].
Economies of scale are a major driving force in the for-
mation of many of these socio-economic networks. Gen-
erally, a well developed economic agent with high con-
nectivity is more attractive or competitive compared to
smaller, less developed agents. The larger agents thus
naturally attract even more connections [8–10]. In so-
cial network theory, this principle is commonly referred
to as preferential attachment, driving the formation of
scale-free networks [11]. In economic theory, economies
of scale have been identified as a key mechanism lead-
ing to the emergence of trade networks and globaliza-
tion [5, 12]. More recently, we have seen the emergence
of quasi-monopolies in digital platform economies where
economies of scale are particularly strong [13–15]. In this
case the winner takes it all. But who wins and how?
Understanding which node in a network is the most
important one and how it ‘wins’ over the competition in
a network globalization process is still largely an open
question. In particular, a systematic study of network
formation in a heterogeneous geographic environment is
a demanding task. Percolation models describing net-
work growth typically involve random processes [16–18],
while optimization models of the network structure typ-
ically start from a single global objective function [19–
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23]. However, neither model class fully describes socio-
economic networks, whose formation is determined by the
individual decisions (optimization, non-random) of in-
teracting agents (multiple different objective functions).
Economic equilibrium models and game-theoretic mod-
els capture these interactions and the individual decision
but quickly become intractable as the number of agents
increases [3, 24–28].
In this article, we study a supply network model
that explicitly includes nonlinear nonconvex economies
of scale and transportation costs and simultaneously en-
ables a semi-analytical treatment by mapping the evo-
lution of the trade network to a percolation problem
[29]. In the model, agents try to satisfy a given de-
mand at minimum costs, either through domestic pro-
duction or via imports. Economies of scale favor the
centralization of production and the emergence of trade.
On the other hand, non-zero transportation costs favor
distributed production. Simulating the evolution of the
trade network in this model allows us to systematically
study how globalization takes place, how the transporta-
tion network affects globalization, and last but not least
which geographic factors provide an advantage for the
economic agents. In particular, we demonstrate that the
way to ‘win’ the globalization process is to be in an ad-
vantageous position on the correct length scale. We show
that the length scale characterizing the competitiveness
of a node changes depending on the stage of globalization
and the speed of globalization process.
II. METHODS
A. Economic percolation model
We analyze the influence of topological features on the
importance of nodes in a network formation model re-
cently introduced by Schröder et al. [29]. The model
describes the formation of trade interactions based on a
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Figure 1. Network Supply Problem. Each node i chooses
a supplier k to satisfy its demand D at minimal cost Ki =
minkKki. These costs include: (I) production costs at node
k, where the costs per unit depend on the total amount of
production Sk at that node (left panel), and (II) transport
costs that depend on the distance Tki between the nodes k
and i in the underlying transport network (dashed line). All
nodes in the network (including k) simultaneously solve their
individual optimization problem.
fundamental network supply problem [5, 12]. The ba-
sic idea is as follows: Each node (or economic agent)
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} in the network has a fixed demand D
(identical for all nodes). A node i can either fill this de-
mand by domestic production or by making purchases
from other nodes it is connected to via the underlying
transport network. Filling this demand always incurs
costs for node i: (I) production costs KPki for production
at node k, even for domestic production where k = i,
and (II) transport costs KTki for transport from node k
to node i if node i makes purchases from other nodes
(k 6= i). This general setup is illustrated in Fig 1.
The production costs of goods manufactured at node
k and consumed at node i are given by
KPki = pk(Sk)× Ski, (1)
where Ski denotes the amount of goods produced at node
k and consumed at node i. The costs per unit pk are
decreasing with the total production Sk =
∑N
i=1 Ski due
to economies of scale at node k. This means production
becomes more efficient for larger quantities. Throughout
this article we assume a linear relation
pk(Sk) = bk − aSk (2)
for the sake of simplicity, where the parameter a ≥ 0
directly quantifies the strength of the economies of scale
and bk is a constant offset different for each node, de-
scribing inherent production cost advantages.
The transport costs
KTki = p
TTkiSki (3)
are proportional to the amount of purchased goods Ski
and the distance Tki between the nodes in the underlying
transport network. The proportionality factor pT con-
trols the importance of transport costs relative to produc-
tion costs. In real-world settings, it typically decreases
over time due to technological advancements in the trans-
port sector and serves as the main control parameter for
the network formation model. Together, the total costs
for node i read
Ki =
N∑
k=1
Kki =
N∑
k=1
KPki + K
T
ki (4)
as illustrated in Fig 1.
Each node i chooses its purchases Ski in order to min-
imize its costs under the constraint that it exactly satis-
fies its demand,
∑
k Ski = D. In general, this leads to N
interacting nonlinear and nonconvex optimization prob-
lems as the production costs depend on the purchases
of all nodes. Nevertheless, a resulting Nash equilibrium,
where no node can further decrease its costs by changing
its supplier, can be computed efficiently as shown in [29]:
Each node i chooses only a single supplier k (either itself
or one other node in the network) that can be found ef-
ficiently with an adapted breadth-first-search. We study
the evolution of trade networks starting from the limit
of infinite transport costs, pT = ∞, such that all nodes
purchase locally and no trade takes place. As the im-
portance of transport costs decreases, some nodes start
to make non-local purchases such that the production Sk
of other nodes increases. Eventually, large common mar-
kets (clusters) emerge in the network of trades Ski, each
with a single supplier node k. In the end, when transport
costs disappear, pT = 0, only one giant market (cluster)
remains with a single supplier k∗ with globally central-
ized production Sk∗ = ND. This evolution is illustrated
in Fig 2 for a small planar network.
In this article we study two main aspects of the forma-
tion of this trade network: First, how does centralization
occur? That is, how does the transition from local pro-
duction at large pT to centralized production at low pT
take place? Second, we analyze who ‘wins’ the competi-
tion. That is, which node k∗ becomes the final supplier
as production is fully centralized for pT → 0.
B. Analysis of network structure
The economic percolation model includes heteroge-
neous geographical conditions explicitly. The matrix Tki
encodes the distances of all pairs of nodes (k, i) which de-
pends on their geographic location and the structure of
the underlying transportation network. Hence, the model
allows to systematically study the influence of geograph-
ical or topological properties on the formation of trade
and the centralization of production. Are there any ge-
ographical or topological features that determine which
node becomes the final supplier and which does not?
To study the impact of the transport network topol-
ogy, we consider four different random network ensem-
bles. We start from an ensemble of geographically em-
bedded networks obtained by distributing N = 1000
nodes uniformly at random on the unit square. Edges are
constructed by a Delaunay triangulation with periodic
boundary conditions. Each of the resulting M = 3000
3(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Figure 2. Market growth in the percolation model. (a) Evolution of the size Si of four markets measured by the
production Si of the markets supplier i. Every node in the network optimizes its costs to satisfy its demand as described in the
main text. As the importance of transport costs pT decreases, nodes make external purchases and common markets (clusters)
emerge where production is centralized at a single node k. As pT → 0, only a single, global market with supplier k∗ = 16
and S16 = 1 remains (blue line). (b-e) Snapshots of the network for different values of pT. The four markets (clusters) with
centralized production shown in panel (a) are illustrated in their respective colors and the central supplier node is highlighted by
a larger circle. Black nodes do not belong to any of these four markets. Solid colored lines indicate active links in the transport
network, dashed lines indicate potential transport links that are not used by the four large markets. Parameters are D = 1/N ,
b ∈ [0, 1] distributed uniformly at random and a = 10−3. The planar network is created as the Delaunay triangulation from
N = 100 points distributed uniformly at random in the unit square (see Methods for more details).
links is undirected and assigned a distance equal to the
Euclidean distance between the connected nodes. The
distance Tij of two arbitrary nodes i, j in the network is
finally obtained as the geodesic or shortest path distance
in the network.
The other random network ensembles are obtained
from the initial ensemble by a reshuffling of the edges.
This procedure keeps the number of connections and the
distribution of the individual edge lengths identical and
thus leaves the networks comparable to each other. We
apply three different reshuffling procedures creating ran-
domizations with different properties: First, we keep the
structure of the network the same but choose a random
permutation of the distances (random weights). This
breaks correlations between the link distances and the
node position. Second, we uniformly randomly rewire
all links to different nodes under the constraint that the
resulting network is connected. The network then has
a topology corresponding to a Poisson random network
[2]. Comparison of this randomization to the original
network allows us to understand the impact of regular
versus random network topologies. Third, we create a
Barabasi-Albert scale-free network with the same num-
ber of links and the same distances for the links [11]. We
thus create four different ensembles with identical aver-
age degree and edge lengths, but vastly different global
structures. For instance, the degree distribution changes
from narrow for the geometric and Poisson random net-
works to heavy-tailed for for scale-free networks.
C. Model parameters
In addition to the structure of the transportation net-
work, several model parameters determine the course of
globalization. First, we note that the system evolution
is invariant with respect to a rescaling of the costs. In
particular, we can set D = 1/N by choosing an appro-
priate unit system. A rescaling of the distances can be
absorbed into the main control parameter pT describing
the transport cost per unit. It characterizes the relative
importance of transportation costs with respect to pro-
duction costs.
Two parameters a and b characterize the production
costs via the costs per unit p(Sk) = bk − aSk [Eq. (2)].
Since only the relative ordering of the costs are rel-
evant to compare different suppliers (in the form of
Kki < Kji), we scale the costs such that all bi ∈ [0, 1]
with mini bi = 0 and maxi bi = 1. In particular, we
choose the bi uniformly at random from the interval [0, 1].
The second parameter a characterizes the economies of
scale and has a strong impact on the model behav-
ior. We perform simulations for vastly different values
a ∈ {10−5, 10−4, . . . 101} to cover different regimes of
globalization. To put this into context, note that to-
tal centralization of production leads to a decrease of
production costs by exactly NDa = a for D = 1/N .
Economies of scale are negligible if a is much smaller
than typical differences of the cost parameter bi, i.e., for
a  1/N = 10−3. Economies of scale are dominant if a
is of the order of the largest difference of the bi, i.e. for
a ≈ 1. The range a ∈ {10−5, 10−4, . . . 101} covers both
regimes.
In summary, we perform simulations for four different
transportation network ensembles and several values of
a. For each case we consider 1000 different random re-
alizations of the network with 10 different permutations
of the bi each, resulting in 10.000 measurements per en-
semble and value of a. For each realization, we start the
simulation in the limit of large transport costs, pT =∞,
without any trade interactions. We then gradually lower
pT and record the emergence of a trade network, i.e., the
4emergence of connected components of the network de-
fined by the purchases Ski, as well as the final supplier
for pT = 0.
III. RESULTS
A. How does globalization emerge?
To understand the emergence of a globalized market
we record the size of the largest markets as the trans-
port costs decrease from pT = ∞ (no trade) to pT = 0
(single, global market). A trade network between nodes
emerges as transportation costs decrease. An example
of the globalization of production is shown in Fig 2 for
a small geographically embedded random network. For
pT = 1.0, several nodes have already decided to purchase
their goods from other neighboring nodes and multiple
markets have formed where production is centralized to
a single node. The markets grow when pT decreases to
pT = 0.5 as further nodes decide to purchase non-locally.
Finally, many nodes again change their supplier, join-
ing one large, global market with strong economies of
scale instead of the smaller local markets. In the end, as
pT → 0, production is fully centralized at a single node.
The size of the four largest markets is shown in Fig 2 (a)
as a function of the transportation cost parameter pT.
Inspecting this evolution, we are directly led to the
question how the transition to globalization takes place
under different circumstances. Is it very sudden with a
single large change in the size of the largest market or
is the transition slow and the largest market grows grad-
ually as pT decreases? Does a single node expand its
market or do multiple large markets grow and only later
merge to one global market? To answer these questions,
we measure the largest gap max[∆S(1)] in the size (total
production) of the largest market [30] as well as the max-
imum size of the second largest market max[S(2)], the
third largest market max[S(3)] and so on over the course
of the evolution from infinite to zero transport costs (see
Fig 3). The maximal size max[S(2)] of the second largest
market in particular measures how much markets grow
before global centralization occurs. If it is small, only a
single large market emerges and local competitiveness is
relevant to gain an early advantage. If it is large, at least
two large markets expand side by side before one of them
becomes globally dominant and production is completely
centralized. Here, the markets have to compete against
each other on a larger length scale. The maximal size
max[S(2)] of the second largest market serves a proxy
for this length scale.
If economies of scale are weak (small values of a),
multiple large markets coexist before they finally merge.
As a becomes larger, the maximum size of all markets
except the largest one decreases. Finally, for strong
economies of scale a, only a single market grows. Corre-
spondingly, globalization becomes more and more abrupt
with increasing a, measured by the growth of the gap
max[∆S(1)]. We thus obtain the following picture: For
weak economies of scale, several markets grow and fi-
nally merge in a gradual process. For strong economies
of scale, only local markets exist until globalization sets
in abruptly. After this sudden transition, exactly one
large market remains.
We observe rather little differences between the four
network ensembles under consideration. The transition
from gradual to abrupt globalization is qualitatively the
same in all networks and also the transition point is re-
markably similar. While the transition is gradual (no
large gaps) for a = 10−5, it is sudden for a = 10−3
for all networks. Slight differences are observed only for
a = 10−4. While the maximum gap is larger than 0.1 for
all realization of the random planar network, the tran-
sition is still gradual with smaller changes of the largest
cluster for most realizations of a scale-free network.
This is rather surprising, as scale free networks are
characterized by the existence of hubs, a few nodes with
very high degree. At first glance, one might expect that
these hubs can exploit economies of scale most easily,
making the transition abrupt already for small a. Our
results show that this simple reasoning fails. The im-
pact of economies of scale on the transition and on the
competitiveness of nodes is more subtle. In fact, differ-
ent hubs have to compete in the globalization process
when the economies of scale are not dominant (small a).
Thus, while hubs allow for the easier formation of local
markets, these markets then have to compete on a larger
length scale (measured by the maximum size of the sec-
ond largest market), where the local properties of the
central supplier, such as the high degree of the hubs, are
less important. Overall, this competition slows down the
centralization of production in scale-free networks.
B. Who wins globalization?
Understanding how globalization occurs, we now ad-
dress the question who wins the competition in the cur-
rent model. That is, which node i becomes the final
supplier of the network for pT → 0? Are there any ge-
ographic features which determine a node’s competitive-
ness?
To characterize the geographical location of a node in a
network, we consider several different centrality measures
that measure different aspects of a node’s position in the
network:
(i) cost centrality 1/bi
(ii) local closeness centrality 1/minjTij
(iii) global closeness centrality 1/
∑
j Tij [31, 32]
(iv) degree centrality [32]
(v) betweenness centrality [32, 33].
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Figure 3. Multiple markets or sudden growth? Distribution of the maximum size max[S(n)] of the n-th largest market
and largest change max[∆S(1)] in the size of the largest market (insets) during the globalization process for (a) the random
planar network, (b) the network with randomized weights, (c) the network with uniformly randomized links and (d) the network
with scale-free randomized links. For small a, multiple large clusters appear and merge slowly in all networks. For large a,
a global market suddenly forms from the individual nodes in a single large cascade before any other market had the chance
to grow significantly. Depending on the value of the parameter a, nodes have to be competitive at different length scales to
become the final supplier. The maximal size of the second largest cluster max[S(2)](red) can serve as a proxy for this length
scale.
These quantities measure the advantage of the nodes in
terms of (i) global production costs, (ii) small transport
costs to a local trade partner, (iii) small transport costs
to the whole network, (iv) immediate access to different
trade partners and (v) position of the node along many
trade routes.
We generally expect that all these properties are ben-
eficial for the nodes. For example, a high cost centrality
implies that production is cheap – at least until produc-
tion costs decrease significantly due to economies of scale.
The node with the highest cost centrality would be the
socially optimal supplier when pT = 0 and minimize the
total costs across all nodes. Similarly, a high global close-
ness centrality implies that transportation is cheap on
average, making the node an attractive global supplier
when transport costs are not zero. The remaining three
centrality measures also point to a favorable position in
the network, but their implication is less clear. High
degree and local closeness point to an attractive local en-
vironment, while high betweenness centrality is a typical
measure of importance in social networks and means that
many shortest transportation routes cross the respective
node.
To understand which of these properties most strongly
influences the competitiveness of a node, we rank all
nodes according to their centralities and evaluate if the
final suppliers typically have a high or low ranking. We
record the final supplier and its centrality ranking x
for each random realization of the globalization process.
The resulting distributions of the ranks of the final sup-
plier are shown in Fig 4 for the four network ensembles
under consideration. In addition, we fit a distribution
P (x) ∼ exp [−m(N − x)] to the observed centrality rank-
ings to quantify the importance of the respective central-
ity. A value of m = 0 indicates a flat distribution, i.e.,
no influence of the centrality rank x on the chance to
become the final supplier. The higher the value of |m|,
the stronger the correlation, and the more meaningful
the respective centrality to predict which node wins the
competition.
The first, expected observation is the influence of the
cost centrality 1/bi of a node i. For weak economies of
scale (small a) the production costs are dominated by the
cost parameters bi and low production costs are decisive
for the competitiveness of a node. For all network en-
sembles under consideration, cost centrality is the best
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Figure 4. How to win network globalization? Distribution of the ranking of the final supplier in various centrality measures
(see main text) in (a) a random planar network, (b) the network with a random permutation of edge distances, (c) a Poisson
random network with a random permutation of the edge distances, and (d) a scale-free network with a random permutation
of the edge distances. All networks are constructed from a Delaunay triangulation of N = 1000 points uniformly randomly
distributed in the unit square, resulting inM = 3000 links with distances equal to the Euclidean distance between the connected
nodes (see Methods for details).
7indicator for competitiveness for small a, whereas its im-
portance decreases for stronger economies of scale.
The second, more striking observation is the impor-
tance of the local closeness centrality. In the case of
strong economies of scale a = 1, this centrality mea-
sure provides the best indicator for the competitiveness
of a node. The histogram of the centrality ranking peaks
strongly at top ranks. Local closeness is even more im-
portant than global closeness, although we evaluate the
global competitiveness of the nodes. Again, this finding
holds true for all four network ensembles.
A surprising correlation is found for the two remaining
centrality measures, degree and betweenness, for the spa-
tially embedded random network. Contrary to our expec-
tation, the final supplier typically has a low degree and
betweenness centrality for strong economies of scale a.
This effect is lost or even reversed for the other network
ensembles and can be attributed to a subtle geometric
property of spatially embedded random networks. In this
network class, local closeness centrality is anti-correlated
with degree and betweenness centrality. As competitive
nodes have a high local closeness, they are likely to have
a low degree and betweenness centrality. This observa-
tion is particularly relevant since real-world transporta-
tion networks are typically spatially embedded, with the
exception of digital, data exchange networks. ote that
similar correlations exist for other network ensembles as
well. For example, nodes with a high degree centrality in
the reshuffled scale free networks typically also have high
local closeness centrality, due to more opportunities for
a short link.
Finally, a more subtle implication of the centrality
measures is that, depending on the parameter a, the
size or length scale of the relevant neighborhood changes.
This length scale is defined by the critical size the largest
cluster must reach before it becomes the global supplier.
The effect is illustrated in Fig 5. For small a, the num-
ber of customers does not affect the costs very much
and one new customer allows the supplier to attract cus-
tomers only in a small additional range [Fig 5 (a)]. Con-
sequently, a node must attract a larger number of cus-
tomers to become globally competitive and the critical
size is (almost) equal to the total size of the network.
In this regime, global centrality measures like the cost
centrality are most relevant. For intermediate a, a sin-
gle customer allows the supplier to attract nodes in a
larger range [Fig 5 (b)]. The critical length scale be-
comes smaller and we need to put more weight to the
local structure. In this regime, the global closeness cen-
trality and the degree centrality start to become better
predictors, quantifying the centrality of a node in a local
neighborhood. Finally, for very large a, the critical size
of the largest cluster becomes 2 and one single customer
induces a sufficiently large change in production costs for
the supplier to become globally competitive [Fig 5 (c)].
The centrality of a node in its most local context then
becomes the deciding factor. This is best measured by
the distance to the nearest neighbor, the local closeness
centrality 1/minjTij .
Comparing results across the different network topolo-
gies, we find that the network topology becomes more
important when the diameter is smaller, i.e., for Poisson
and scale-free network structure. Since the total trans-
port costs in these networks are smaller (proportional to
the smaller diameter of these networks), the critical size
to become the global supplier is also smaller. Thus, local
length scales and the (local) network structure become
important already for smaller values of a.
IV. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
Economies of scale are a decisive factor in the for-
mation of socio-economic networks and the globalization
and centralization of economic activities. Eventually, the
winner takes all. Here we have studied core aspects of the
question who wins and how.
The formation of socio-economic networks is a guiding
research question across disciplines, including economics
[4–6, 12], sociology [3, 27, 34] and statistical physics
[2, 11]. Key mechanisms and global properties of net-
work formation through economies of scale have been
thoroughly analyzed [5, 11, 27], whereas the microscopic
processes in large systems with many heterogeneous ac-
tors are much harder to grasp. Most traditional models
of network formation do not explicitly capture the behav-
ior of individual actors [11, 17, 35]. Percolation models
are based on random processes, while optimization mod-
els typically assume a common global objective function.
In contrast, game theoretic models describing individual
agents [21, 25, 26, 36] are typically hard, if not impos-
sible, to solve for large heterogeneous systems. In this
article, we have analyzed a supply network model [29]
that explicitly includes economies of scale and individual
decisions, yet remains simple enough to allow for an effi-
cient simulation of network formation and centralization
in large heterogeneous environments. We exploit this fact
to reveal the most important topological properties that
determine the success of a node in the globalization pro-
cess. We find that different length scales determine the
success of a node, depending on the speed of the global-
ization.
The model yields the structure of a trade network given
an underlying transportation network as a function of
two main parameters: the strength of economies of scale
a and the transport costs per distance pT. As trans-
port costs decrease, trade links are established and the
production is centralized to fewer and fewer nodes. For
weak economies of scale, this process is gradual. Nodes
compete at all length scales and the internal cost pa-
rameters are decisive for the competitiveness of a node.
Only nodes with low productions costs bi have a chance
to become the final supplier of the network once produc-
tion is centralized completely. The geographic location of
the nodes in the network, characterized by different cen-
trality measures, plays only a minor role. In contrast, if
8(a) (b) (c)
Figure 5. Impact of a single customer. Sketch of the effect of a single (new) customer for a node. With the new customer
production increases and the production costs per unit decrease by aD. This compensates larger transport costs for nodes
further away from the supplier. Consequently, the supplier becomes competitive in a larger range and can potentially attract
additional customers. The blue circles indicate the distance that is compensated by the decrease in production costs due to one
customer (two customers). (a) For small a, the change in production cost is small and likely has no immediate effect [compare
a = 10−4 in Fig 4(a)]. The nodes have to compete at all length scales. (b) For intermediate a, a single customer may reduce
the costs sufficiently to cause additional nodes to change their supplier. In this case, nodes have to compete at a local scale
until they reach a size sufficiently large to take over the global market. (c) For large a, a single customer definitely reduces
the costs sufficiently to cause a cascade of purchasing decisions and the first node to attract a customer takes over the whole
market. Here, only the immediate neighborhood of a node decides about its success [compare a = 1 in Fig 4(a)].
economies of scale become dominant, this picture changes
entirely: Production is centralized in a single transition
once transportation costs decrease below a critical value.
Only a single node attracts a significant number of cus-
tomers and wins the competition. Moreover, the transi-
tion becomes abrupt and as such hard to foresee. The
chance of a node to win is now mostly determined by
the location of the node in the network. Interestingly,
however, global centrality measures are not the best in-
dicator for competitiveness. Instead, a local measure of
the distance to the nearest neighbor, referred to as local
closeness, is the best indicator for the success of a node.
Loosely speaking, we our findings are as follows: For
weak economies of scale the internal properties of a node
or economic agent are decisive. Competition occurs
across all length scales in the network and basic efficiency
provides the greatest advantage in all stages of global-
ization. Only the (globally) most efficient nodes have a
chance to take over the market. For strong economies of
scale speed becomes the most important factor, rather
than efficiency or global location. Competition occurs
only locally to gain a first advantage and only the agent
with the highest local closeness can rapidly attract the
first external customers and then exploit economies of
scale to grow its market, skipping over the competition
in other stages of globalization. For the future it would
be of eminent interest to study how other factors influ-
encing globalization confirm or modify these findings and
whether they can be confirmed in real world settings.
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